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Antitrust Implications of the Copyright
Alert System
By BREANNA ROSE*
THE COPYRIGHT ALERT SYSTEM is a private copyright enforce-
ment mechanism jointly adopted by numerous content owners and
internet service providers to deter illegal peer-to-peer file sharing.1
While many analysts have studied how the Copyright Alert System in-
teracts with other areas of American jurisprudence, few commentators
have analyzed its significant antitrust implications. This paper ex-
plores the history of online copyright infringement through peer-to-
peer file sharing, an overview of the Copyright Alert System, and the
antitrust ramifications resulting from private copyright enforcement
through the Copyright Alert System.
Introduction
In July 2011, a conglomerate of content owners2 and internet ser-
vice providers3 announced the formation of the Copyright Alert Sys-
tem, which is a graduated notification system aimed at educating,
alerting, and punishing individual internet service subscribers who en-
gage in online copyright infringement.4 The Copyright Alert System,
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1. See Memorandum of Understanding, Preamble, CENTER FOR COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
(July 6, 2011), [hereinafter Memo] https://www.copyrightinformation.org/wp-content/
uploads/2013/02/Memorandum-of-Understanding.pdf [https://perma.cc/WA78-4QBS].
2. Memo, supra note 1, at Section 1. Entertainment industry associations involved in-
clude the Independent Film and Television Alliance (“IFTA”) and the American Associa-
tion of Independent Musicians (“A2IM”); Recording Industry Association of American
members Universal Music Group, Warner Music Group, Sony Music Entertainment, and
EMI Music; and Motion Picture Association of America members Walt Disney Studios Mo-
tion Pictures, Paramount Pictures, Sony Pictures Entertainment, Twentieth Century Fox
Film Corporation, Universal Studios, and Warner Brothers Entertainment. Memo, Section I
(July 6, 2011).
3. See Memo, supra note 1, at Attachment A.
4. See Memo, supra note 1, at Part IV(G).
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commonly referred to as the “six strikes” program,5 requires signatory
content owners to monitor peer-to-peer file sharing sites for
downloaded copyrighted material. Once the content owner informs
the internet service provider of a subscriber’s alleged copyright in-
fringement, the six strikes policy is enforced against the subscriber,
which may culminate into a copyright infringement lawsuit if not
resolved.6
After the Copyright Alert System’s implementation in February
2013, legal analysts have evaluated the relationship between the Alert
System and other areas of American law such as the First Amend-
ment,7 fair use,8 and §512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(“DMCA”).9 In addition to these concerns, private copyright enforce-
ment through the Copyright Alert System may also produce negative
antitrust implications. Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits any re-
straint of trade that may boycott individuals or companies from engag-
ing in a free market industry.10 By allowing companies that would be
natural competitors to enter into both a horizontal and vertical agree-
ment to privately enforce copyright protections, and effectively punish
alleged infringers via ambiguous “mitigating measures”11 without legal
authority, these companies may be illegally restraining trade by pur-
posefully blacklisting consumers who receive online media content
from other sources.12 The Copyright Alert System may also be consid-
ered an anti-competitive behavior under §1 of the Sherman Act under
both a per se and rule of reason analysis.
Peer-to-Peer File Sharing—The Evil or the Excuse?
Peer-to-peer file sharing is the process of sharing online material,
such as media files, music, books, movies, and games, directly from
one end-user computer to another.13 Early versions of file-sharing sites
5. Cyrus Farivar, “Six Strikes” Program Could Affect Businesses Too, Even if Infringer is
Unknown, ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 14, 2013), http://arstechnica.com/business/2013/01/six-
strikes-program-could-affect-businesses-too-even-if-infringer-is-unknown/ [https://perma
.cc/366Q-9DVK].
6. See Memo supra note 1, at Part IV(G)(i) (July 6, 2011).
7. E.g., Peter K. Yu, The Graduated Response, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1373, 1413–16 (2010).
8. Id. at 1417–18.
9. Id. at 1403–10.
10. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
11. See Memo, supra note 1, at Part IV(G)(iii).
12. See generally id. at Part IV (G)(iv).
13. What You Need to Know About Peer-to-Peer File Sharing, ZONEALARM BY CHECKPOINT
(June 4, 2014), http://www.zonealarm.com/blog/2014/06/what-need-know-about-peer-
to-peer-file-sharing/ [https://perma.cc/X2EZ-ZKCD].
Issue 2] ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 373
simply connected end-user computers (“leechers”) who wanted digital
media to a network of “seeders,” other end-users who distributed digi-
tal media content.14
Previous peer-to-peer networks employed a centralized communi-
cation model, a type of online network where all users connected to
one central server. Currently, peer-to-peer networks use a non-central-
ized model. Multiple servers rather than one15 now allow individuals
to connect to other “seeders” who install peer-to-peer software on
their own computer.16 This decentralized approach has made identify-
ing and catching peer-to-peer content sites, such as BitTorrent, signifi-
cantly more challenging. BitTorrent is a peer-to-peer file sharing
network that allows users to search, download and upload media files
to popular torrent interface sites, such as The PirateBay, through the
following process:
[T]o download a file [ . . . ], you have to find and download a
torrent file (which uses the .torrent file extension) and then open
it with your BitTorrent client software. The torrent file does not
contain your files. Instead, it contains information which tells your
BitTorrent client where it can find peers who are also sharing and
downloading the file.17
Peer-to-peer file sharing can be a high-speed and low bandwidth
way to share large files between computers, allowing large amounts of
data to be transmitted without spending thousands of dollars on
bandwidth costs.18 But, there are many critics that condemn peer-to-
peer file sharing as illegal and morally wrong.
Although over 70 million people engage in peer-to-peer file shar-
ing,19 in most instances it is still considered copyright infringement.
Under copyright law, a copyright owner has the exclusive right to
copy, create derivative works of, distribute, perform, and display their
14. Defining Peer-to-Peer File Sharing: How it Works, THE LSE CYBERLAW STUDENT BLOG
(Feb., 2016), http://lsecyberlaw.blogspot.com/2016/02/defining-peer-to-peer-file-shar-
ing-how.html, [https://perma.cc/SL9X-YEVQ].
15. Id.
16. See generally Carman Carmack, How BitTorrent Works, HOW STUFF WORKS (March 26,
2005), http://computer.howstuffworks.com/bittorrent1.htm [https://perma.cc/V3A7-2B
KA].
17. Adam Pash, A beginner’s guide to BitTorrent, LIFE HACKER BLOG (Aug. 3, 2007, 24:00
EST), http://lifehacker.com/285489/a-beginners-guide-to-bittorrent [https://perma.cc/
626D-UG2Q].
18. Id.
19. Ray Delgado, Law professors examine ethical controversies of peer-to-peer file sharing,
STANFORD REPORT (Mar. 17, 2004), http://news.stanford.edu/news/2004/march17/file
share-317.html [https://perma.cc/YGE2-HPKH].
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work.20 Any unauthorized person who violates one of these exclusive
rights is liable for copyright infringement.21 In order for an end-user
to receive the digital material in peer-to-peer file sharing, the user
must “download” the file to their computer, which results in an elec-
tronic “copy.” The act of downloading copyrighted material without
the copyright owner’s permission is typically considered copyright in-
fringement unless the material is being used for the purpose of criti-
cism, education, news reporting, scholarship, or commentary.22
This poses a new and unique problem with copyright enforce-
ment. With millions of people participating in peer-to-peer file shar-
ing, enforcing online copyright protection is becoming very difficult.
Currently, relief from online copyright infringement is only available
in the form of individual lawsuits filed against each infringer, which
results in considerable monetary and efficiency concerns.
American attitudes about peer-to-peer file sharing are also shift-
ing. In the US alone, 80% of people who possess online music files
and 73% of people who possess online TV and movie files believe that
it is “perfectly appropriate” to share them with family members.23 Ad-
ditionally, younger Americans between 18–29 years old believe that
uploading and linking unauthorized TV/movie files online is reasona-
ble.24 Historically, public opinion of peer-to-peer file sharing has been
overwhelmingly negative.25 This recent shift surrounding peer-to-peer
file sharing may have longstanding jurisprudential effects on how
courts view protecting online copyright protections.
A primary reason why peer-to-peer file sharing is still viewed so
negatively is due to the supposed economic effects on the entertain-
ment industry. Yet the large quantity of peer-to-peer shared files may
not produce the profound economic impact that the entertainment
industry claims. Although overall music sales declined with the intro-
duction of peer-to-peer file sharing technology, beginning with Nap-
ster,26 varying economic studies have linked the downturn of music
20. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1990).
21. See 17 U.S.C. § 501 (2006).
22. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1990).
23. Attitudes about Piracy, THE AMERICAN ASSEMBLY, http://piracy.americanassembly
.org/copy-culture-report/attitudes/ (last visited May 11, 2016) [https://perma.cc/43PK-
JFGQ].
24. Id.
25. Bootie Cosgrove-Mather, CBS news poll: Young Say File Sharing OK, CBS NEWS (Sept.
18, 2003), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/poll-young-say-file-sharing-ok/ [https://perma
.cc/T4MW-C877].
26. See Sanjay Goel, Paul Miesing, & Uday Chandra, The Impact of Illegal Peer-to-Peer File
Sharing, 52 CAL. MGMT. REV. NO. 3, 6 (2010), http://www.albany.edu/~pm157/research/
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sales to a shift in how consumers enjoy music rather than “piracy” over
peer-to-peer networks.27 Yochai Benkler, a co-director of the Berkman
Center for Internet & Society at Harvard University, goes so far as to
suggest that peer-to-peer file sharing may actually be economically ef-
ficient in the long term.28
In the film industry, a study published by the Motion Picture As-
sociation of America stated that American studios lost $2.373 billion
to internet piracy through peer-to-peer file sharing in 2005.29 Yet com-
mentators have doubted the study’s legitimacy due to lack of statistical
and scientific transparency.30 Additionally, the study assumed that one
lost movie sale amounted to one illegal download from a peer-to-peer
network. This assumption fails to consider that a downloader may not
have purchased, or even watched the movie unless it was available in a
peer-to-peer network.31
Although peer-to-peer file sharing may be an efficient, profitable,
and widespread solution to acquiring online content, it is still illegal.
Conventional anti-piracy efforts have inadequately addressed the long-
standing issue around file sharing—how to stop mass online copyright
infringement by millions of Americans. The Copyright Alert System is
the entertainment industry’s attempt to develop a private solution.
The Copyright Alert System—An Overview
The Copyright Alert System was prescribed in a Memorandum of
Understanding among some of the largest internet service providers
such as Verizon, Comcast, and a conglomerate of large entertainment
The%20Impact%20of%20Illegal%20Peer-to-Peer%20File-Sharing%20on%20the%20Me
dia%20Industry.pdf [https://perma.cc/FYK2-4Y4M].
27. The NDP Group: Music File Sharing Declined Significantly in 2012, NDP GROUP
(Feb. 12, 2016), https://www.npd.com/wps/portal/npd/us/news/press-releases/the-npd-
group-music-file-sharing-declined-significantly-in-2012/ [https://perma.cc/8QTT-CUST].
See also Felix Oberholzer-Gee & Koleman Strumpf, The Effect of File Sharing on Record Sales:
An Empirical Analysis, 115 J. OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 1, 1–42 (Feb. 2007).
28. YOCHAI BENKLER, THE Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms
Markets and Freedom, 86 (2006).
29. Swedish Authorities Sink Pirates Bay, ECHE. . .BLAH. . .BLAH (May 31, 2016), http://
echeblahblah.blogspot.com/2006/06/swedish-authorities-sink-pirate-bay.html [https://
perma.cc/PV8R-TC5M ].
30. See generally Ken Fisher, The problem with MPAA’s shocking piracy numbers, ARS
TECHNICA (May 5, 2006), http://arstechnica.com/uncategorized/2006/05/6761-2/
[https://perma.cc/7KMW-47KJ].
31. Felix Oberholzer & Koleman Strumpf, The Effect of File Sharing on Record Sales: An
Empirical Analysis, UNC CHAPEL HILL (March, 2004) at http://www.unc.edu/~cigar/pa-
pers/FileSharing_March2004.pdf [https://perma.cc/GK5U-WL4N].
376 UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51
content owners.32 The Memorandum of Understanding outlines a
uniform graduated response system that signatory internet service
providers must implement against alleged copyright infringers.33 A se-
ries of notices are sent to an internet subscriber’s registered email ac-
count after a content owner notifies their internet service provider of
a subscriber’s infringing behavior.34
Content owners use “certain automated techniques” to identify
subscribers who they think are engaged in peer-to-peer file sharing.35
However, the validity and accuracy of these techniques are unsubstan-
tiated, with weak legal footing when determining what constitutes cop-
yright infringement. Once an internet service provider is notified of a
subscriber’s alleged copyright infringement, the Copyright Alert Sys-
tem is implemented.
The program is divided into a four-step procedure capable of dis-
tributing up to six alerts to a given subscriber.36
Step 1: Initial Education
Once the Copyright Alert System is activated, the internet service
provider is required to notify their subscriber of the alerted infringe-
ment via an Initial Education notice.37 Typical information contained
in an educational notice states that: (1) online copyright infringement
is an illegal act punishable under §512 of the Digital Millennium Cop-
yright Act (“DMCA”), (2) the subscriber cannot engage in online cop-
yright infringement, (3) online copyright infringement is also a
violation of their internet service provider’s terms of service, (4) sub-
scribers can obtain copyrighted works lawfully through the internet
service provider, and (5) continued infringing behavior will result in
further actions by the internet service provider.38 Internet service
providers can send up to two educational notices to each alleged
infringer.39
After the Copyright Alert System is triggered, signatory content
owners face some repercussions. Content owners are removed from
32. See Memo, supra note 1, at Attachment A (July 6, 2011).
33. See generally Memo, supra note 1, at Part IV(G) (July 6, 2011).
34. Id.
35. Copyrights and Verizon’s Copyright Alert Program, VERIZON, https://www.verizon.com/
support/consumer/account-and-billing/copyright-alert-program-faqs (last visited Jan.,
2017) [https://perma.cc/XPL5-J8PP].
36. See generally id.
37. See id.
38. See Memo, supra note 1, at Part IV(G)(i) (July 6, 2011).
39. Id.
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the copyright enforcement process, leaving only internet service prov-
iders to implement the Copyright Alert System. Additionally, once the
Copyright Alert System is activated, content owners cannot seek fed-
eral copyright remedies against an infringer until the last step of this
system is completed. This bars content owners from receiving mone-
tary remedies against an alleged infringer until after the sixth strike is
implemented.40 Content owners can also only report a limited num-
ber of alleged copyright infringements per month, thus requiring con-
tent owners to discriminate between infringing subscribers that they
want to pursue.41
The Copyright Alert System may also have an impact on internet
service providers. Signatory internet service providers may be pre-
cluded from copyright liability under DMCA section 512. Under the
DMCA, online service providers are exempt from copyright liability if
they respond to directed notices of copyright infringement with miti-
gating measures, such as taking down the illegal file.42 It is unclear if
DMCA remedies would be helpful in combating peer-to-peer sharing,
or even that peer-to-peer sharing existed when the law was passed. If
an internet service provider implements this system, they may be
shielded from future copyright liability. Thus, content owners waive
their right in advance to pursue financial remedies against internet
service providers, which may or may not be a good trade.
Subscribers also face procedural effects beyond receiving an edu-
cational notice. At this stage, subscribers cannot combat any allega-
tions of copyright infringement, even in cases of mistaken alerts.
Subscribers must wait until the third stage of the Copyright Alert Sys-
tem to challenge any mistaken or alleged copyright infringement.
Thus, the Copyright Alert System fails to provide adequate “due pro-
cess” to subscribers, or any kind of process whatsoever, until the third
stage of alerts and punishment.
Step 2: Acknowledgment
The Acknowledgment Step requires an internet service provider
to send a third notice to the alleged infringer. The internet service
provider requires the subscriber to acknowledge their receipt of the
40. See generally Memo, supra note 1, at Part IV(G)(iv) (July 6, 2011).
41. See Memo, supra note 1, at Part V(C) (July 6, 2011).
42. See generally Ashley Cullins, Music Industry A-Listers Call on Congress to Reform Copy-
right Act, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (March 31, 2016, 13:48 EST) http://www.hollywoodre-
porter.com/thr-esq/music-industry-a-listers-call-879718 [https://perma.cc/JM5P-GFFS].
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first two notices and agree to cease all infringing conduct.43 This alert
is supposed to be carefully worded to not require the subscriber to
“acknowledge participation in any allegedly infringing activity.”44 This
step also requires internet service providers to alert subscribers that
their identity and information may be provided to third parties, such
as content owners, if their conduct continues.45
In order for a subscriber to acknowledge the alert, the subscriber
must go to either a temporary landing page or a “pop-up” notice will
appear.46 If infringing behavior continues, the internet service pro-
vider has the choice of sending another Educational Alert or sending
up to two Acknowledgment Step Copyright Alerts.47 It seems that this
stage only prolongs the Educational Stage with an additional bite, re-
quiring acknowledgement of copyright infringement regardless of
culpability.
Step 3: Mitigation Measures
The Mitigation Measures stage escalates previous notification re-
quirements. This stage requires:
(a) [the subscriber] acknowledge . . . receipt of the Copyright Alert
as described in the Acknowledgement Step, (b) [confirmation
that]. . . the subscriber has received prior warning regarding al-
leged peer-to-peer online infringement, and (c) inform[s] the sub-
scriber that, per the Participating Internet Service Provider’s . . .
Terms Of Service and as set forth in prior Copyright Alerts, addi-
tional consequences [shall] be applied upon the subscriber’s
account . . . .48
A subscriber is given an allotted grace period to dispute the no-
tice.49 If the subscriber does not dispute the notice within the grace
period, the internet service provider must implement various mitigat-
ing measures against the subscriber. These mitigating measures in-
43. See Memo, supra note 1, at Part IV(G)(ii) (July 6, 2011).
44. Id.
45. “Participating ISP may provide relevant identifying information about the Sub-
scriber and the Subscriber’s infringing conduct to third parties, including Content Owner
Representatives or their agents and law enforcement agencies.” See Memo, supra note 1, at
Part IV(G)(ii) (July 6, 2011).
46. See Memo, supra note 1, at Part IV(G)(ii) (July 6, 2011).
47. Id.
48. See Memo, supra note 1, at Part IV(G)(iii) (July 6, 2011).
49. A subscriber can dispute the notice through application to the Independent Re-
view Program, which provides a binding decision within the confines of the Copyright
Alert Program. See Memo, supra note 1, at Part IV(H)(i) (July 6, 2011). The Dispute period
is calculated as ten business days or fourteen calendar days after receipt of the notice. See
Memo, supra note 1, at Part IV(G)(iii) (July 6, 2011).
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clude temporary reductions and restrictions of the subscriber’s
internet service for a “reasonable” period of time as determined at the
discretion of the internet service provider.50
For a subscriber to dispute an alleged infringement,51 they must
challenge the allegation under one of six grounds:52 (1) misidentifica-
tion of the account, (2) authorization to download, (3) misidentifica-
tion of the file, (4) work was published before 1923, (5) fair use, and
(6) unauthorized use of the subscriber’s account.53 A subscriber must
also pay a nonrefundable $35.00 fee54 unless they qualify for a hard-
ship waiver.55 The subscriber’s disputed copyright infringement claim
then is resolved through the binding decision of an ad hoc Indepen-
dent Review Board. This leaves all due process concerns to be resolved
in a burdensome and scant proceeding. The Independent Review
Board does not allow subscribers to challenge alleged copyright in-
fringement under theories of copyright invalidity, de minimis copy-
ing, or any exception as outlined under 17 U.S.C. §§108-122, such as
the “library exception.”56
Additionally, if either the content owner or alleged copyright in-
fringer seeks further legal review, any determination of the Indepen-
dent Review Board is excluded from admission as evidence. This
forces both content owners and subscribers to re-plead their case in
court and submit evidence of copyright infringement that is difficult
to ascertain without an internet service provider’s assistance.57
Step 4: Post-Mitigation Measures
The final escalation is the Post Mitigation Measures step, which
requires that the internet service provider give another notice of al-
leged infringement and requires the subscriber to seek review.58 If the
subscriber does not seek review, the internet service provider must
implement one of the above mitigating measures and may take legal
action under the repeat infringer policy as outlined under section 512
50. Id.
51. See generally Memo, supra note 1, at Part IV(H) (July 6, 2011).
52. See Memo, supra note 1, at Attachment C, Part I(i)–(iv) (July 6, 2011).
53. Id.
54. See Memo, supra note 1, at Attachment C, Part IV(vi)(i) (July 6, 2011).
55. See generally id.
56. See Defenses to Copyright Infringement, UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA, http://www
.unc.edu/~unclng/copyright-defenses.htm (last visited Jan, 2017) [https://perma.cc/
XT9V-Y6RM].
57. See Memo, supra note 1, at Part IV(G)(i) (July 6, 2011).
58. See Memo, supra note 1, at Part IV(G)(iv) (July 6, 2011).
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of the DMCA.59 The repeat infringer policy under §512(i)(1)(A) of
the DMCA requires that the internet service provider “(i) adopt a pol-
icy that provides for the termination of service access for repeat copy-
right infringers, (ii) inform users of the service policy, and (iii)
implement the policy in a reasonable manner.”60 While it seems that
the Copyright Alert System may fulfill this requirement, the DMCA
provision requires the internet service provider to go one step further
and complete termination of the subscriber’s account.
Although the internet service provider does not need to continu-
ally send notices during this period, it must track the subscriber’s on-
line activity and report all infringement allegations to content owners
who choose to initiate a lawsuit.61 An internet service provider can
waive this step if it directs its subscriber to a “final warning” notice.62
Antitrust Law
Overview—The Sherman Act and Antitrust Legal Standards Of
Review
The Sherman Antitrust Act was a late nineteenth century legisla-
tive response to the rise and expansion of large companies such as the
Standard Oil Company.63 The Act aimed to help prevent the rise of
monopolistic conglomerates. This gave the Attorney General author-
ity to sue companies engaging in anticompetitive behavior.64 Over the
years, antitrust enforcement has evolved to enforce fairness and pro-
tectionism in the competitive process, maintaining that consumers
should be entitled to have a high supply of goods at the lowest prices
possible.65 Thus, antitrust law protects a free marketplace rather than
specific competitors.66
Section 1 of the Sherman Act states that “every contract, combi-
nation in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations,
59. Id.
60. See Capitol Records, L.L.C. v. Escape Media Group, Inc., 114 U.S.P.Q.2d 1196
(S.D.N.Y. March 25, 2015).
61. See Memo, supra note 1, at Part IV(G)(iv) (July 6, 2011).
62. Id.
63. WILLIAM LETWIN, Law and Economic Policy in America: The Evolution of the Sherman
Antitrust Act, 54–55 (1965).
64. Id. at 94.
65. KEITH N. HYLTON, Antitrust Law: Economic Theory and Common Law Evolution (2003)
40–42.
66. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962).
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is declared to be illegal.”67 Any supposed violation of this section is
adjudicated against either a “per se” or “rule of reason” standard.
“Per se” antitrust violations are practices that the Supreme Court
has deemed prima facie evidence of illegal conduct such as horizontal
price-fixing and group boycotts.68 Per se violations provide a guide-
post for public and private companies to know what business practices
are blatantly illegal.69 Per se illegal business practices offer no pro-
competitive justifications to the market.
For business practices that may have arguable pro-competitive
benefits, courts use a “rule of reason” standard.70 In a rule of reason
analysis, the court determines whether the company in question has
sufficient market power71 to have an impact on competition.72 If the
business has sufficient market power, then the court weighs if the
challenged business practice has any justifiable pro-competitive bene-
fits enough to outweigh its inherent anticompetitive effects.73
Tensions Between Antitrust Law and Copyright Law—The Copyright
Alert System
Antitrust and copyright law are philosophically in tension with
one another. Copyright law seeks to enjoin authors with monopolistic
rights to their work,74 whereas antitrust law attempts to limit the mo-
nopolistic power of individuals and corporations.75 Yet both copyright
law and antitrust law coexist within American law because, arguably,
67. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
68. Horizontal price fixing refers to competitors at the same level of the market distri-
bution chain agreeing to sell items or services at a certain price, typically a price that is
greater than the natural free market would allow. Roberta F. Howell, “Price Fixing and Other
Horizontal Requirements,” DISQUS (March 2, 2011), https://www.inddist.com/article/2011/
03/price-fixing-and-other-horizontal-requirements [https://perma.cc/8E9P-CGE5]. See
also HYLTON, supra note 65, at 104–31 (2003).
69. Id. at 129–31.
70. Id. at 104–105.
71. Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Robert H. Lande, & Steven C. Salop, Monopoly Power
and Market Power in Antitrust Law, 27 J. REPRINTS ANTITRUST L. & ECON. 585 245 (1997)
(discussing economic meaning of market power and monopoly power).
72. California Dental Ass’n v. Fed. Trade Comm’n., 526 U.S. 756, 782 (1999) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (“I would break that question down into four, classical, subsidiary antitrust
questions: (1) What is the specific restraint at issue? (2) What are its likely anticompetitive
effects? (3) Are there offsetting procompetitive justifications? (4) Do the parties have suffi-
cient market power to make a difference?”).
73. Id.
74. Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Copyright Misuse and the Limits of the Intellectual Property Mo-
nopoly, 6 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 3 (1998).
75. See generally Memo, supra note 1, at, Part IV(C) and accompanying text (July 6,
2011).
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they both have similar fundamental aims—to allow creativity and in-
novation to flourish within a free market system.
The Copyright Alert System requires internet service providers,
whose aggregate market share approaches monopoly levels, to help
content owners privately enforce their copyright monopolies. In ex-
change, the internet service providers acquire immunity from liability
for the copyright infringements that occur on their networks. Al-
though internet service providers and content owners have valid justi-
fications, it is questionable whether they have the right to jointly
encroach on the rights of subscribers.
Group Boycotts—Evolving Legal Standards
The Memorandum of Understanding, under which the Copy-
right Alert System was formed, may be considered a group boycott
against individual internet subscribers. If the Memorandum of Under-
standing is considered a group boycott, then the Copyright Alert Sys-
tem is deemed a per se violation of antitrust law and is consequently
illegal.
A group boycott is when natural competitors voluntarily agree to
abstain from buying, using, or dealing with a particular party.76 The
Supreme Court prominently addressed the illegality of group boycotts
in Fashion Originators’ Guild of America v. Federal Trade Commission.77
Similar to the Copyright Alert System’s Memorandum of Understand-
ing, in Fashion Originators’ Guild of America, textile manufacturers
banded together to form the Fashion Originators’ Guild of America
(“FOGA”), which was aimed to combat the appropriation of non-copy-
rightable designs by other manufacturers. After its formation, FOGA
created and operated a complex private enforcement system for track-
ing participating retailers who sold pirated garments.78 The Court
found that the agreement between retailers and manufacturers to
only sell original designs and consequently punish retailers who re-
neged on this arrangement to be a per se illegal violation of antitrust
law. The Court stated that “the combination is in reality an extra-gov-
ernmental agency, which prescribes rules for the regulation and re-
straint of interstate commerce, and provides extra-judicial tribunals
for determination and punishment of violations, and thus ‘trenches
76. CHRISTOPHER R. LESLIE, ANTITRUST LAW AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
460–62 (2011).
77. See Fashion Originators’ Guild of America v. Fed. Trade Comm’n., 312 U.S. 457
(1941).
78. Id. at 461–62.
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upon the power of the national legislature and violates the [antitrust
laws.]’”79
While the Supreme Court has never overruled using a per se stan-
dard of review when assessing group boycotts, in certain instances the
Court has implemented a more lenient standard of review. In the Su-
preme Court case, Federal Trade Commission v. Indiana Federation of Den-
tists,80 Indiana dentists who were involved in a professional
organization “refused to submit x-rays to dental insurers for use in
benefits determinations. . .”81 The Court stated that the dentists did,
in fact, engage in a group boycott.82 Although historically group boy-
cotts were deemed a per se violation of antitrust law,83 the Court con-
tinued to analyze the case under an abridged rule of reason
approach.84 In this abridged approach, the Court looked at the type
of restraint at issue and any pro-competitive justifications for the re-
straint.85 The Court did not look extensively at market power, stating
that:
[S]ince the purpose of the inquiries into market definition and
market power is to determine whether an arrangement has the po-
tential for genuine adverse effects on competition . . . proof of ac-
tual detrimental effect, such as a reduction of output, can obviate
the need for an inquiry into market power, which is but a “surro-
gate for detrimental effect.”86
Although the Court did not look at market power in its abridged
rule of reason analysis, the enormous aggregate market power of sig-
natory content owners and internet service providers would provide
further evidence against the antitrust legality of the Copyright Alert
System under a comprehensive rule of reason or per se analysis.
Sherman Act Implications of the Copyright Alert System
The Copyright Alert System may not survive either a per se or
rule of reason antitrust analysis. At its core, the Copyright Alert System
is a concerted restraint of trade between content owners and internet
service providers: it privately enforces copyright protections against
79. Id. at 465.
80. Fed. Trade Comm’n. v. Indiana Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
81. See id. at 449.
82. Id. at 458.
83. Id. at 458.
84. Id. at 459.
85. Id. at 460–61.
86. Id.
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subscribers who use peer-to-peer file sharing to receive online
content.
Type of Agreement and Restraint at Issue
The first steps in determining whether the Copyright Alert Sys-
tem violates §1 of the Sherman Act are to analyze whether: (1) the
Memorandum of Understanding is a horizontal or vertical agreement
between content owners and internet service providers; and (2) the
Copyright Alert System restrains trade. If the Copyright Alert System is
considered either a horizontal restraint of trade, group boycott, or
vertical restraint of trade, the Copyright Alert System may violate anti-
trust law and the court should apply either a per se or rule of reason
analysis to determine its validity.
Horizontal or Vertical Agreement
A horizontal agreement to restrain trade is “made between com-
peting businesses to manipulate competition amongst all competitors
in the marketplace.”87 Horizontal agreements require that all partici-
pating businesses within a horizontal restraint operate at the same
level in the market.88 Industry-wide conspiracies amongst businesses at
the same level of the supply chain are often viewed as horizontal
agreements.89 A vertical agreement to restrain trade, in contrast, is
“made between a seller and a buyer in where a retailer can buy prod-
ucts from one manufacturer but in the agreement is restricted from
buying from a competing manufacturer.”90 In a vertical restraint, busi-
nesses at different levels of the supply chain cooperate.91 Both vertical
and horizontal agreements to restrain trade may violate antitrust law if
the arrangements adversely affect the free market.92 Typically, hori-
87. Horizontal and Vertical Agreements that Violate the Sherman Act, STUDY.COM,
http://study.com/academy/lesson/horizontal-and-vertical-agreements-that-violate-the-
sherman-act.html (last visited Feb., 2017) [https://perma.cc/QBH9-KVFZ].
88. See generally Executive Summary of Antitrust Laws, FINDLAW, http://corporate
.findlaw.com/business-operations/executive-summary-of-the-antitrust-laws.html (last vis-
ited Feb., 2017) [https://perma.cc/EER6-39F4].
89. U. S. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Securities Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694, 729–30 (1975).
90. Id.
91. See generally Executive Summary of Antitrust Laws, FINDLAW, http://corporate.findlaw
.com/business-operations/executive-summary-of-the-antitrust-laws.html (last visited Feb.,
2017) [https://perma.cc/DK5G-4XCG].
92. Id.
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zontal restraints are per se violations of antitrust law.93 The rule of
reason analysis is always used to evaluate vertical restraints.94
To determine whether the Copyright Alert System is a horizontal
or vertical arrangement, we must analyze the structure of the Memo-
randum of Understanding. In this case, numerous content owners
and internet service providers have signed the Memorandum of Un-
derstanding. This makes the Memorandum of Understanding a hori-
zontal agreement among content owners and a parallel horizontal
agreement among internet service providers. Additionally, the Memo-
randum of Understanding brings together internet service providers
and content owners, constituting a vertical agreement between the
suppliers of internet services and the owners of the copyrighted mate-
rial distributed via the internet.
The majority of the agreement details duties that are owed to
content owners by internet service providers in a seemingly vertical
arrangement. However, the agreement also incorporates horizontal
aspects. According to §5(C) of the Memorandum of Understanding,
content owners must collude to only submit a limited number of ini-
tial internet service provider notices per month.95 This provision con-
stitutes an expressed horizontal arrangement between content owners
to limit the number of notices of infringement reported to participat-
ing internet service providers.
It can be argued that horizontal collusion also occurs among in-
ternet service providers who, through the Copyright Alert System,
have laid out a precise mechanism for alerting, educating, and punish-
ing subscribers for alleged copyright infringement.96 Although spe-
cific technical implementation mechanisms are not outlined in the
Memorandum of Understanding, the agreement outlines pointed and
specific requirements and all signatory internet service providers must
follow each step of the Copyright Alert System. A signatory internet
service provider can only escape this arrangement and cease participa-
tion once the agreement is no longer effective.97
93. Thomas B. Leary, A Structured Outline for the Analysis of Horizontal Agreements, FED.
TRADE COMM’N (2004), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_state
ments/structured-outline-analysis-horizontal-agreements/chairsshowcasetalk.pdf [https://
perma.cc/CC73-KW7N].
94. Id.
95. See Memo, supra note 1, at Section V(C) (July 6, 2011).
96. See Memo, supra note 1, at Section IV (July 6, 2011).
97. See Memo, supra note 1, at Section VIII (July 6, 2011) (the effective term date of the
Memorandum of Understanding is four (4) years upon execution).
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The Memorandum of Understanding is not likely to be viewed as
strictly as a vertical restraint, which is subject to a comprehensive rule
of reason analysis, because of the parallelism of the agreement be-
tween two layers of competitors, content owners, and internet service
providers. Additionally, the Memorandum of Understanding is not
likely to be viewed as an isolated horizontal agreement subject to a
strict per se analysis because of its collusive vertical elements. Since
private copyright rights are involved, courts have several options when
choosing a standard of review for the Copyright Alert System. Courts
can analyze the Copyright Alert System under: (1) a group boycott
standard of review similar to Fashion Originators’ Guild of America v. Fed-
eral Trade Commission, subject to per se antitrust liability; (2) a general
per se standard of review; (3) an abridged rule of reason standard of
review; or (4) a comprehensive rule of reason standard of review.
Group Boycott Analysis
The restraint of trade at issue within the Memorandum of Under-
standing resembles a group boycott similar to Fashion Originators’ Guild
of America v. Federal Trade Commission.98 The Copyright Alert System is
a self-enforcement mechanism that allows content owners and in-
ternet service providers to deal, or refuse to deal, with alleged copy-
right infringers. Instead of targeting companies such as non-signatory
content owners and internet service providers, the Copyright Alert
System punishes subscribers directly.99 The Copyright Alert System de-
tails multiple punitive measures to block consumers from receiving
internet services including: (1) sending warning notices to subscrib-
ers;100 (2) directing subscribers to a landing page without the con-
sumer’s consent;101 and (3) temporarily stepping down the
consumer’s internet service,102 which can be described as a blatant
restriction of service. This refusal to provide internet service to alleged
copyright infringers may constitute a group boycott of subscribers.
However, a court may be hesitant to label the Copyright Alert System
as a group boycott because subscribers can still receive internet ser-
vices from their internet service providers, just not at the same caliber.
98. 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
99. See Memo, supra note 1, at Section VI(G) (July 6, 2011).
100. See Memo, supra note 1, at Section IV(G)(i) (July 6, 2011).
101. See Memo, supra note 1, at Section IV(G)(ii) (July 6, 2011).
102. See Memo, supra note 1, at Section IV(G)(iii) (July 6, 2011).
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Per Se Analysis
Courts still may attach per se antitrust liability to the Copyright
Alert System even if it is not considered a group boycott. The Memo-
randum of Understanding is an express agreement in which five pow-
erful internet service providers and influential content owners have
agreed horizontally within their prospective industries to adhere to
the prescriptions of the Copyright Alert System. If a signatory party
does not adhere to the Copyright Alert System, it is in violation of the
Memorandum of Understanding and may be liable for breach of con-
tract. Historically, it is this industry-wide restriction amongst content
owners and internet service providers that constitutes a horizontal re-
striction on trade, which is deemed a per se violation of antitrust
law.103
Nevertheless, if the Copyright Alert System is not deemed a per se
violation, the Alert System would likely not survive a rule of reason
analysis.
Comprehensive Rule of Reason Analysis
Under the Copyright Alert System, powerful internet service prov-
iders use their overwhelming market power to affect individual sub-
scriber connections. Although a subscriber may have the ability to
change internet service providers, this ability is hindered by enormous
transfer costs and the Post Mitigation Measure Step, where the in-
ternet service provider is required to disclose identity information to
other content owners.104 In order to determine whether the Copy-
right Alert System could pass a comprehensive rule of reason analysis
(and, in turn, an abridged rule of reason analysis), a court must look
at the internet service providers’ (1) market power and (2) the Copy-
right Alert System’s anticompetitive effects.105 Signatory parties may
present pro-competitive justifications to validate their business
practice.
103. Thomas B. Leary, A Structured Way for the Analysis of Horizontal Agreements, FED.
TRADE COMM’N (2004), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_state
ments/structured-outline-analysis-horizontal-agreements/chairsshowcasetalk.pdf [https://
perma.cc/6KN5-BTZ7].
104. See Memo, supra note 1, at Section IV(G)(iv) (July 6, 2011).
105. Daniel C. Fundakowski, The Rule of Reason: From Balancing to Burden Shifting, The
Civil Practice & Procedure Committee’s Young Lawyers Advisory Panel: Perspectives in An-
titrust (Jan 22, 2013), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications /anti-
trust_law/at303000_ebulletin_20130122.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/QX7S-
XZB9].
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Market Power
For the Copyright Alert System to pass a comprehensive rule of
reason analysis, the parties to the Memorandum of Understanding
must have sufficient market power. If a court decides to implement an
abridged rule of reason analysis, no determination of market power is
needed.106 The product, in this case, is the broadband107 internet ser-
vice market. Subscriber participants are the share affected by the re-
straint. Market power is determined by analyzing the (1) relevant
product market involved and (2) geographic market.
Product Market
Generally, a subscriber can receive broadband internet access
through a fiber-optic service, satellite internet service, digital sub-
scriber line (“DSL”), broadband over powerlines (“BPL”), cable
modem, or through wireless options.108 Of these six alternatives, it is
safe to assume that the wireless versions (wireless and satellite internet
services) are not comparable to the other four alternatives because of
their increased restrictions on bandwidth usage109 and signal la-
tency.110 Additionally, DSL may be eliminated as a comparable substi-
tute because its speed and efficiency is physically limited by its
proximity to the telephone company’s office.111 Thus, for a subscriber
to receive relatively comparable internet access to the signatory in-
106. See generally Fed. Trade Comm’n. v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460–61
(1986).
107. The reason the relevant product at hand is broadband internet service access is
because the five signatories to the Memorandum of Understanding provide broadband
internet access. Dial-up access, which is the other alternative for internet access, is the
traditional way to receive internet service but is much slower and much more outdated
than broadband internet service.
108. Types of Broadband Connections, FED. COMM. COMM’N, https://www.fcc.gov/gen-
eral/types-broadband-connections (last visited March 25, 2016) [https://perma.cc/UHC5-
JUUS].
109. Satellite Internet, ISP REVIEWS, http://www.isp-reviews.org/satellite.htm (last visited
Feb., 2017) [https://perma.cc/3EPK-KA55].
110. Id.
111. DSL modems follow the data rate multiples established by North American and
European standards. In general, the maximum range for DSL without a repeater
is 5.5 km (18,000 feet). As distance decreases toward the telephone company of-
fice, the data rate increases. Another factor is the gauge of the copper wire. The
heavier 24-gauge wire carries the same data rate farther than 26-gauge wire. If you
live beyond the 5.5 kilometer range, you may still be able to have DSL if your
phone company has extended the local loop with optical fiber cable.
Fast Guide to DSL, WHATIS, http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/0,,sid9_gci213915,00
.html (last visited April 1, 2016) [https://perma.cc/9MLQ-2GBM].
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ternet service providers, their options are to switch to fiber-optics,
cable modem, or BPL.
Geographic Market
Conservatively, signatory internet service providers constitute
over 60% of the relevant national market of internet service provid-
ers.112 The lower limit to establish a sufficient presumption of market
power is 55%.113 Yet, even though the signatory internet service prov-
iders compose 60% of the national relevant market, a more accurate
indicator of their market power can be seen through analyzing their
relevant power on a localized basis.
In 2010, the Federal Communications Commission estimated
that about 75% of the national population of internet subscribers
could only have their local cable television company as a high-speed
internet service provider.114 In effect, if the local internet service pro-
vider happens to be Verizon, Cablevision, AT&T, or Time Warner
Cable,115 then subscribers have no other option but to adhere to their
service in order to also receive television services. A deficiency of in-
ternet options has been a common problem across the country; even
the Bay Area is mostly provided by either Comcast or AT&T.116 Al-
though some areas provide alternative high-speed internet access,
their network and services may not be as advanced as the signatory
internet service providers.
For example, Comcast provides multiple package options that
may bundle telephone, internet, and cable services together, making
it difficult, if not impossible, to delineate their internet service from
the other two services together. Switching to another internet service
provider may entail high switching costs and cancellation fees. These
factors make transferring to a new high-speed internet service pro-
vider difficult, if not unfathomable, unless the subscriber is willing to
112. ISP Usage and Market Share, STATOWL, http://www.statowl.com/network_isp_mar
ket_share.php (last visited March 27, 2016) [https://perma.cc/Y4CV-AHRY].
113. United States v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 2005).
114. Connecting America: National Broadband Plan, FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N (2010),
http://download.broadband.gov/plan/national-broadband-plan.pdf [https://perma.cc/
N3EJ-9GXN].
115. See Memo, supra note 1, at Attachment A (July 6, 2011).
116. Troy Wolverton, Hey Bay Area, your choices for broadband service are between bad and
worse, SILICONBEAT (March 28, 2013), http://www.siliconbeat.com/2013/03/28/hey-bay-
area-your-choices-for-broadband-service-are-between-bad-and-worse/ [https://perma.cc/N
4DW-7UTV].
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forgo their television subscriptions. Courts should weigh these factors
when evaluating the barriers to switching internet service providers.
Anticompetitive Effects
Consumer welfare is of great concern in antitrust law, yet the fun-
damental implementation of the Copyright Alert System may punish
subscribers who are accused, but not guilty, of copyright infringe-
ment. If a subscriber does not engage in online copyright infringe-
ment, they cannot declare their innocence until the third step in the
alert process. Additionally, if a subscriber succeeds in challenging the
alleged infringement, they must jump through several financial and
arbitrational hoops before receiving reprieve.
To challenge a claim of copyright infringement, a subscriber
must: (1) pay an additional $35 fee above their monthly subscription
price, (2) have their case heard at an ad-hoc extra-judicial tribunal,
and (3) assert only one of six defenses to rebut a presumption of copy-
right infringement. Throughout this process, a subscriber’s internet
service will still be hampered. Additionally, a subscriber must chal-
lenge and win all prior accusations of infringement, with no time limi-
tation on their duration, or they face continuing legal and service
repercussions.
Under the Copyright Alert System, the subscriber is also pre-
sumed to be an infringer without any due process investigation. The
alleged infringer, instead of the internet service provider or content
owner, has the burden to prove their innocence and disprove copy-
right infringement. This is a burden shift from what is required to
prove copyright infringement under §501 of the Copyright Act, which
states that the content owner, not the alleged infringer, must establish
that they are the holder of the copyright and prove that the defen-
dant, the subscriber, infringed on this right.117 Under the Copyright
Alert System, subscribers are forced, without access to any evidence, to
prove that they did not infringe. All evidence of copyright infringe-
ment is kept with the content owner and internet service provider,
making incorrect accusations of copyright infringement more preva-
lent than under federal law proceedings to establish copyright
infringement.
Lawful subscribers may also suffer from the misapplication of the
Copyright Alert System. Although the Copyright Alert System and
remedies provided by Congress aim to protect innovation and creativ-
117. 17 U.S.C. § 501 (2006).
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ity among content creators, all consumers of online media may not be
copyright infringers. Incorrect implementation of the Copyright Alert
System against non-infringers may upset law-abiding subscribers and
negatively shift public concern away from protecting copyright rights
altogether.
The Copyright Alert System also restricts content owners from is-
suing their own notices of copyright infringement. Content owners
must go through a quota-like system of reporting to internet service
providers, who in turn administer the four-step alert system. Internet
service providers are also restricted within the confines of the Copy-
right Alert System, thus removing their ability to engage in competi-
tion without fear of repercussions for violating the Memorandum of
Understanding. This restriction of internet service providers and con-
tent owners reinforces the anticompetitive nature of the Memoran-
dum of Understanding, and the lack of a clear abdication clause
prevents a party from reneging on the Memorandum without facing
contractual repercussions.
Furthermore, the Memorandum of Understanding requires sig-
natory parties to share information about subscribers between in-
ternet service providers and content owners. The Supreme Court has
deemed such collusive information sharing as anticompetitive viola-
tions of antitrust law.118
Pro-Competitive Justifications
The Copyright Alert System provides few pro-competitive benefits
to subscribers. Online infringement may contribute to internet con-
gestion, but if a subscriber is using high speed internet, the slowdown
is negligible.119 Although there are pre-existing federal protections
for copyright, if the Copyright Alert System is implemented correctly,
it may provide incentives to create new and innovative works.120 Addi-
tionally, subscribers who engage in peer-to-peer file sharing may have
increased risk for security breaches of important sensitive
information.121
118. United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 444 (1978).
119. Will sharing slow down my Internet connection?, SPEEDGUIDE, http://www.speedguide
.net/faq/will-sharing-slow-down-my-internet-connection-186 (last visited May 13, 2016)
[https://perma.cc/P7YV-CJRG].
120. See Memo, supra note 1, at Preamble (July 6, 2011).
121. Peer-to-Peer File Sharing: A Guide for Business, FED. TRADE COMM’N (2010), https://
www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/peer-peer-file-sharing-guide-business
[https://perma.cc/Z2KW-9L7J].
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From a purely economic standpoint, the Memorandum of Under-
standing could create an incentive for internet service providers to
implement only the least restrictive punishments allowed under the
Copyright Alert System, thus enticing subscribers to choose their ser-
vice over others. This would allow internet service providers to lure
subscribers away from one another, resulting in increased competi-
tion among internet service providers.
Conclusion
The Copyright Alert System empowers content owners, internet
service providers, and consumers to acknowledge and take accounta-
bility for widespread instances of online copyright infringement. If
not challenged, however, the Copyright Alert System may create a
safe-haven for legally-sanctioned monopolies in the internet and en-
tertainment industries. This would allow them to flourish, extending
beyond the boundaries of what federal copyright was meant to pro-
tect. The government has an obligation to protect both copyright
owners and consumers, and it must balance the benefits of a private
enforcement mechanism, such as the Copyright Alert System, against
potential harms to consumers. Administratively, the Copyright Alert
System seems convenient, but the government must remain active in
regulating its breadth.

